RENDLESHAM: INAUGURAL EVENTS OF 26 DECEMBER

I wanted to take one last look at the overall evidence for our first night’s circumstances.

There remain ‘loose ends’ which are troubling and just in case something had been overlooked, or suddenly now, with hindsight made sense, or new information I was unaware of

One fresh dilemma is that whilst official statements from Airman 1st Class John Burroughs, Master-Sergeant J. D. Chandler and Lieutenant Fred Buran, all document commencement of events on the morning of 26 December, as 0300, Staff-Sergeant Jim Penniston’s proclaimed original notebook, has an entry confirming events on our first night, began at 0002.

Neither Penniston’s official statement, nor that of Airman Ed Cabansag, record the time at which an alert was raised.

Burroughs is on record as accepting, that the incident could have been initiated earlier than he recalled.

Buran writes, “The following statement is general in nature and may be inaccurate in some instances due to the time lapse involved and the fact that I was not taking notes at the time of the occurrence”.

Might this equally apply to Chandler – their written testimonies were not requested by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Halt until 2 January, which Halt explains was due to the holiday period.

Could we possibly have sufficient, established case evidence, to reach a conclusion.

From 'Into the Night", by AJS Rayl, we have a particularly detailed and helpful account, Jim Penniston explaining how the sequence of events unfolded.

"About 12:02 am -- I remember that distinctly -- I was dispatched to the East Gate, which was sometimes referred to as the back gate at Woodbridge. There, I was told to contact Police 2, which was Airman First Class John Burroughs and Staff Sgt. Bud Steffans, and that I would be briefed when I got there.

"Upon arriving at the East Gate, Staff Sgt. Steffans told me that there was a problem out in the woods. I gazed about 300 meters into the distance and saw what appeared to be a fire. My first impression was that we had an aircraft down. I saw orange, red, and bluish types of glowing light, pretty standard with aircraft crashes. I asked Staff Sgt. Steffans if he had heard it go down.

He told me there had been no sound, that it didn't crash, that it had landed. I discounted that and, after assessing in my own mind what to do, decided we should call it in to our superiors at Bentwaters Center for Security Control (CSC).

"I went to the gate shack, phoned in, and spoke with Master Sergeant J.D. Chandler, who was the on-duty flight chief for both bases. He asked me to stand by while he contacted the Control Tower at Bentwaters and also at Woodbridge. While I was talking with Chandler, the security controller was making contact with Bentwaters Control Tower, and they, in turn, were in contact with Heathrow Airport's Control Tower in London and RAF Bawdsey Eastern Radar in East Anglia. I was told they reported a bogie about three miles out from Bentwaters but had lost contact with it 15 minutes previously. The confirmation that triangulated the radar sighting was RAF Bawdsey. It had been over Woodbridge, they told me, when it dropped from radar imaging.

"I was still pretty sure it was an aircraft downing at that point and asked Master Sgt. Chandler for permission to investigate. 

Master Sgt. Chandler contacted the shift commander's office, and within a minute or so I got the go-ahead to proceed off base with two other security policemen".

Consequently, we have the  following timeline:

1) From East Gate sentry point,  Penniston makes the landline call to Chandler.

2) Whilst talking with Chandler, the security controller contact RAF Bentwaters control tower.

3) They, in turn, contact Heathrow and RAF Bawdsey.

4) Penniston asks Chandler for permission to investigate further.

5) Chandler contacts the shift commander, Buran, and permission is granted.

Burroughs seemingly confirms much of the above, in personal correspondence, circa 2000:

"When Penniston came down he could also see the woods were lit up and called CSC. After the shift commander LT Buran who had CSC call a RAF Base and Heathrow tower who stated there was a object over Bentwaters and disappeared off radar authorized us to go off base and see if a plane went down.

Well we were told there was a object over the base seen by radar over the radio and that it had disappeared and that's why they thought a plane might have went down".

All of this would have taken considerable time, plus need to add more for Burroughs and Steffans original observation from RAF Woodbridge, opening East Gate, driving to the clearing entrance and then returning to East Gate, before requesting assistance.

Consequently, the timeline entries in Penniston's notebook, would appear to allow a comparative period for same, i.e.:

0002 Notified East Gate

0015 Rendezvous / east gate with P-2 / P-3* 

0020 Assessed possible A/C Downing 

0051 ECP established D-1/ S5 Plot

0100 Determined not to be A/C crash

0115 White, blue and red yellow lights in woods investigated & observed.

(End of extract)

An hour, or so, must surely already be accounted for?

Buran states:

“SSgt Penniston reported getting near the "object" and then all of a sudden said they had gone past it and were looking at a marker beacon that was in the same general direction as the other lights. I asked him, through SSgt Coffey, if he could have been mistaken, to which SSgt Penniston replied that had I seen the other lights I would know the difference. SSgt Penniston seemed agitated at this point.

They continued to look further, to no avail. At approximately 0354 hours, I terminated the investigation and ordered all units back to their normal duties”.

The problem arises when our 03:00 commencement time, only allows for 54 minutes, in total, before Buran terminates the investigation, after they have travelled so far as crossing a ''creek"/stream – Burroughs account confirming:

“We got up to a fence that separated the trees from the open field and you could see the lights down by a farmers house. We climbed over the fence and started heading towards the red and blue lights and they just disappeared. Once we reached the farmer's house we could seea beacon going around so we went towards it. We followed it for about 2 miles before we could see it was coming from a lighthouse.

We had just crossed a creek and were told to come back...’.

Cabansag reiterates:

“But we ran and walked a good 2 miles past our vehicle, until we got to a vantage point where we could determine that what we were chasing was only a beacon light off in the distance”.

Logically, they must have been able to make that journey from starting time of incident, circa 0300, to furthest point of venture, covering some 2 miles, in 54 minutes, less time taken up for an assessment of the situation, etc.

All accomplished, of course, within difficult terrain, plus requiring to climb over a fence and carefully cross a water feature, in relative darkness.

Furthermore, on the way there, they proceeded with caution, at one alarming point, as Burroughs notes, “All three of us hit the ground and whatever it was started moving back towards the open field and after a min or 2 we got up and moved into the open field”.

If we accept this timescale and work backwards, then how long might it have taken them to reach that landmark, beyond the stream, some 2 miles distant.

We might have a vital clue, possibly something which is unpublished evidence.

Hidden in long- forgotten correspondence with John Burroughs, I have discovered the following e-mail:

26 August, 2003

"Plus if you put together the 3 statements you will see there was more going on than just the light house beams we were following after we first saw the lights and believe me it was way past 5:00 before we got back to where we first saw the lights".

Although obviously some uncertainty, as to what exactly "where we first saw the lights", pertains to, it perhaps gives us a rough idea of the overall perspective.

If we assume it means 'the clearing', or where their vehicle was parked, then the return journey, from cessation of investigation at 0354 until arrival back, took over an hour – note that Burroughs says “way past” 0500.

As it seems reasonable to presume it would have been an approximate equivalent on the outward journey, the 0300 until 0354 duration does not appear to equate.

Conversely, if over an hour elapsed from their vehicle to furthest point - let’s say 90 minutes - and if they returned at 0354, then departure time would be 0224 (call it 0225)

Subtract the initial period for Penniston to actually arrive at East Gate, check out the situation, call Central Security Contract, await developments from their radar enquires, etc., - say 45 minutes – this becomes 0140.

We have notebook entries:

0100 Determined not to be A/C crash

0115 White, blue and red yellow lights in woods investigated & observed.

It’s not that far off, given that this is a roughly comparative exercise with obviously unknown quantities concerning how much slower they may in fact have been when outbound  and whilst carrying out their investigation, continually attempting to establish radio communications and so on.

Effectively, there does seem to be a situation where Jim Penniston's avowed, original notebook entries are in an acceptable accordance.

This is naturally subject to revision, should new evidence otherwise, come to light.

It is also imperative to stress, this relates solely to the timeline entries not associated with any examination of a tangible object.

Those entries are an entirely separate matter and intended to be outwith any remit here....

... it’s the Rendlesham forest case, though.

Never going to be anything like straightforward.

THE TIMEKEEPING ANOMALY

The notebook now produced by Jim Penniston contains the following, sequential, entries:

“Lift off 2:45 No Sound No air disturbance No other Identified markings”

“Take off Unknown Speed Impossible.”

"0345 Physical markings on forest floor Triangular measuring Approx 10 feet apart 1 ½ inch depressions Round, Dinner Plate size”

The 0345 entry is ostensibly problematic, as it notes the time when they had returned to the 'landing site' on their way back and when Burroughs pointed out some ground indentations.

However, Buran stated that he had terminated the investigation at 0354, at which time, they were situated beyond the second farm field.

Penniston openly discusses this in ‘The Rendlesham Enigma' (2019), co-authored with Gary Osborn and wonders if he might simply have entered the time Buran had ordered their return, suggestion that perhaps it was actually 0345 and 0354 might have been a typo on Buran’s statement.

Fair enough, at least he does address the issue.

How then to rationalise why Penniston's entry is timed earlier, than when they were ordered to return.

I can offer a new possibly.

The thought occurred...

Was his watch running slow, or something...

Evidently so, as he confirms in ‘The Rendlesham Enigma'.

Describing a discovery when they had eventually returned to  base: 

"Curious, I then looked at my watch, which read 4:15 a.m. However, I was surprised to discover that the time according to everyone else was 5:00 a.m. Some 45 minutes was missing.

It certainly didn’t feel as if we had been out there all that time. My watch, which was a quartz digital, hadn’t acted up before, and for a quartz watch to be slow or stop unless the battery dies is impossible. The battery in my watch was fine as it was still working. Also, unlike mechanical watches, quartz watches are not usually affected by magnetic fields, unless the magnetic field is extremely strong".

It is noted that the watch was still working and not simply ceased to function at 04:15.

Consequently, at the point of Penniston’s 0345 entry, whilst that was the time shown on his watch, it could in reality have been much later, which could resolve the apparent enigma.

However, this now also questions the timing of other entries, obviously dependant on when the anomaly with his watch began.

To what extent it might be significant in relation to the timeline, is always going yo be an arbitrary judgement.

The gist of it all is still apparent.

I have been discussing the case evidence with co-author Gary Osborn, who is naturally aware of this content and I have implored his assistance in one final attempt to track down the origin of an extremely interesting sketch.

Gary initially replied that Penniston did not recognise it and thought the drawing could have been made by Halt.

I have explained it is definitely Penniston’s handwriting and was first published, without an explanation, as part of the aforementioned 1994 (I think) OMNI Internet article ‘Into the Night’, by AJS Rayl.

It looks like a really early sketch and part of a map shows at the bottom, with “LIGHTHOUSE VISIBLE” written.

We shall see what transpires and can only hope that referencing the OMNI article connection helps.

Corroborating Penniston’s version of how matters unfolded, is correspondence I received from Geraldo ‘Jerry’ Valdez, way back in April, 1997.

He wrote:

I was assigned to RAF Bentwaters in August of 1980.

I worked with Burroughs and Penniston.

(...)

The acting squadron was the 81st. SPS and "B" Flight was the acting security force on duty. Burroughs and Penniston were on "B" flight.

Shift change was from 26th at 2300 hrs till 0700 hrs of the 27th.

The top Flight Sgt on duty was MSgt Fail. Lt.Col. Halt was not there the first night.

It was a bitterly cold night and clear.

Radio communications were disrupted on and off due to some type of atmospheric disturbance. The radios weren't working at all that night.. We switched channels all night.

Contact had been lost with Burroughs, Penniston and Beachum [Cabansag - James].

(...)

Codes in use at that time and which have now been declassified were "Helping Hand" - a potentially hostile threat - and "Covered Wagon" - a confirmed hostile threat.

If the first alert status was unresolved after 30 minutes, it automatically became a confirmed, hostile threat.

The person on the post should have been Burroughs, but he was missing, the weapons were missing and the phone was off the hook.

This was around 2:00 a.m.

We were carrying weapons and were told to hold our position. MSgt Fail went out.

(...)

Burroughs and Penniston finally showed up. I somehow think something happened to them. They were acting strange.

(...)

As far as people that saw or knew about this incident, there were well over 30 security people who swept the area looking for Beachum, Burroughs and Penniston, who were missing”.

That last sentence has always puzzled; this implies a serious situation of concern, had been determined.

Yet, no trace of any rationale why.

Until the publication of Penniston’s book and a revelation therein:

"I then took out my notebook and wrote the following “Radio difficulty”. Although I was receiving no response from CSC, I continued to transmit and advise. It was my hope that CSC was receiving – or at best, our messages were being relayed by either Airman Cabansag, or more likely by MSgt. Chandler, who would surely now have been ‘on scene’ at the East Gate. I talked into the radio and quickly added that there was a landed craft in front of me, which was fully-intact and mechanical in nature.

Then addressing SSgt. Coffey in the hope that he could hear me, I asked him to initiate a 'Helping Hand Report".”

Although absolutely no trace of this being received, within existing case documentation, we would appear to have another twist in a still seemingly never-ending roller coaster of maybes.

For this has now been claimed:

The Rendlesham Forest Incident - One step away from DEFCON 1

There are some other new bits and pieces, which shall leave aside until later –  perhaps enough to contemplate for now.